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IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON JUVENILE
OFFENDERS: A CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, after many years of avoiding the issue, the United States
Supreme Court finally addressed the constitutionality of imposing the
death penalty upon individuals who were juveniles at the time of their
offenses. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,' the Court reversed the petitioner's
death sentence imposed upon petitioner for a brutal murder he committed
as a fifteen-year-old. 2 A plurality of the Supreme Court 3 held that
Oklahoma's imposition of the death penalty upon an individual who
was fifteen years old at the time of this offense4 violated the eighth
amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments." 5
The Thompson Court relied heavily upon the actions of state legislatures
and sentencing juries as important indicia of society's interpretation of
"cruel and unusual punishment." ' 6
One year after Thompson, in two consolidated cases, Stanford v.
Kentucky7 and Wilkins v. Missouri,8 a plurality of the Supreme Court 9
affirmed the death sentences imposed for murders committed by the
petitioners when they were seventeen and sixteen years old respectively. 0
A plurality nearly mirroring that in Thompson held that it is not "cruel
and unusual punishment" under the eighth amendment to impose capital
punishment on individuals who were sixteen or seventeen at the time
of their crime." In support of its opinion, the Stanford plurality, like
1. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
2. Id. at 838.
3. Id. at 816. Justice Stevens authored the plurality opinion, joined by Justice Brennan, Justice
Marshall, and Justice Blackmun. Justice O'Connor, concurring only in the judgment, filed a separate
opinion. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, filed a dissent. Justice
Kennedy did not participate in the decision.
4. Thompson was certified to stand trial as an adult under 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1112(b)
(1987).
5. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment's restrictions are applicable
to Oklahoma through the fourteenth amendment. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864.
6. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-23.
7. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
8. Id.
9. Id. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White, and Justice Kennedy. Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
filed a separate opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice
Stevens, filed a dissent. This line-up was a near mirror image of that in Thompson. The plurality
in Thompson formed the dissent in Stanford. The dissenters in Thompson, joined by Justice Kennedy,
who took no part in the consideration or decision in Thompson, formed the plurality in Stanford.
In both cases, Justice O'Connor cast the deciding vote.
10. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361.
11. Id.
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the plurality in Thompson, relied on state statutes and their individual
application as "objective indicia" of society's interpretation of "cruel
and unusual punishment.' ' 2 The Stanford plurality, however, arrived
at quite a different result.
This comment explores current death penalty law as applied to ju-
veniles. It begins with a brief examination of the historical evolution
of the death penalty as applied to juvenile offenders, including an
exploration of the current status of various state death penalty statutes.
Next, it reviews the three recent United States Supreme Court cases
which challenged the constitutionality of imposing a death sentence upon
individuals who were minors at the time of their crimes. Finally, this
comment analyzes the implications of Thompson, Stanford, and Wilkins
on the Court's future review of juvenile death penalty cases.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
To analyze effectively the Court's holdings in Thompson, Stanford,
and Wilkins, a brief examination of the evolution of the death penalty
in general, as well as an examination of the evolution of the death
penalty as applied to juveniles, is necessary.
A. An Early Perspective on the Death Penalty
Before the Enlightenment, society did not question whether the state
had the right to kill its offenders. Rather, society contemplated what
would be the most effective (most ingenious and cruel) method of
execution.' 3 Death alone was not considered sufficient punishment unless
it was preceded by terror, torture, and public humiliation.' 4 Boiling,
burning, beheading, dismembering, impaling, crucifying, stoning, stran-
gling, and burying alive were methods implemented to achieve these
goals. 5 Besides addressing murder and treason, England's response to
crime included the imposition of the death penalty for more than 200
separate offenses, including pick-pocketing, associating with gypsies, and
stealing turnips. '6
The execution of Damiens, for the attempted assassination of King
Louis XV of France in 1757, was perhaps history's most gruesome:
His flesh was torn with red-hot pincers, his right hand was burned
with sulfur, his wounds were drenched with molten lead, his body
was drawn and quartered by four horses, his parts were set afire,
and his ashes were scattered to the winds. 17
This most spectacular execution was accomplished before a large crowd. 8
12. Id.
13. Revenge is the Mother of Invention, TtmE, Jan. 24, 1983, at 36.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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B. Evolution of the Death Penalty as Applied to Juvenile Offenders
Criminal jurisprudence in the United States today originated in Eng-
land and other parts of Europe. Although the eighth amendment cat-
egorically prohibits the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishments,"
the framers never intended to prevent the capital punishment of all
individuals who were minors at the time of their crimes.' 9 Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England, widely accepted at the time
the eighth amendment was adopted, described the common law's view
of age and its effect upon the imposition of capital punishment.
20
Then, as now, a fundamental principle of criminal law was that
children under seven years of age were incapable of forming the criminal
intent necessary for the imposition of criminal liability. 2' In the eighteenth
century, however, this presumption of absolute incapacity was rebuttable
for individuals from ages seven to fourteen. If the requisite criminal
intent was proven, a seven-year-old was subject to punishment as an
adult, including, theoretically, a sentence of death. 22 For children older
than fourteen years, the rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit
a capital offense disappeared, and a fifteen-year-old was subject to adult
punishment .23
Historically, juveniles as a class were neither categorically immune
from conviction for capital offenses, nor immune from the imposition
of capital punishment. 24 However, although some children in England
were sentenced to death and executed, a dichotomy between death
sentencing and actual execution existed. In London, between 1801 and
1836, not one of the 103 children under the age of fourteen sentenced
to death was executed. 25
Throughout the history of the United States, 16,000 offenders have
been executed. 26 Of these 16,000 executed, 282 were under the age of
eighteen at the time of their offenses. 27 As of September 1989, ap-
proximately 2,200 individuals were on death row. 28 Of these 2,200,
twenty-eight were under the age of eighteen at the time of their offenses.
29
19. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 863-64.
20. Id.
21. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment for
Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. Rav. 613, 614-15 (1983). Victor L.
Streib is a legal scholar and is recognized as a leading authority on the issue of the death penalty
as it applies to juvenile offenders. He has written over 100 papers, articles, and books on the
subject. Currently, Professor Streib is a Professor of Law at Cleveland State University. He has
served as a juvenile court prosecutor and has represented juvenile defendants in courts from the
local trial level to the United States Supreme Court. He was co-counsel for the petitioner in
Thompson v. Oklahoma.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864.
25. Streib, supra note 21, at 615.
26. Streib, Testimony: Legislative Criteria Concerning the Death Penalty for Juveniles 4 (Sept.
27, 1989) (submitted to the Constitution Subcommittee of the United States Senate).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. Of these twenty-eight who were under eighteen at the time of their capital offense, one
was fifteen, four were sixteen, and twenty-three were seventeen. Id.
Spring 19911
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C. Theories of Punishment Underlying the Death Penalty
Legal scholars cite various reasons for the imposition of legal pun-
ishment.30 The goals of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation are
the social purposes which the United States Supreme Court permits
when affirming a sentence of death.3
When laws were enacted that eliminated the ancient notion of "lex
talionis,' 3 2 the government became responsible for retaliating on behalf
of the victim. The purposeful infliction of retributive punishment causes
the offender to suffer to an extent commensurate with his offense.3
The United States Supreme Court has opined that the severity and
finality of capital punishment is appropriate to the seriousness and
finality of murder.34 Capital punishment ends the existence of the capital
offender forever, and it is this irrevocability that fuels the controversy.
The concept of deterrence is a theory under which the threat of future
punishment either specifically discourages the offender from future crim-
inal conduct, or discourages other potential offenders from similar acts."
There is, however, no conclusive statistical evidence that the death
penalty is a better deterrent than alternative forms of punishment .36
There is no scientific method available for gathering statistics reflecting
the number of potential offenders who choose not to commit a crime
because of the fear of execution.
Incapacitation contemplates the separation of the offender from those
he may harm. Protection of society through incapacitation may be
achieved either by incarceration or execution. Although execution ensures
that the individual executed will never harm again, incarceration cannot
guarantee this end. The vast majority of convicted individuals are ul-
timately returned to society,3 7 and the minority who do spend the
remainder of their lives in prison continue to pose a threat to their
fellow inmates and prison employees.
D. Current Status of Death Penalty Statutes
As of September 1989, thirty-six states plus the federal government
had death penalty statutes on their books. 8 Of these thirty-seven ju-
30. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRnINAL LAW 22-26 (2d ed. 1986). See generally J.
WILSON & R. HERRNsTEiN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATuRE 489-507 (1985). Typically addressed are
theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. At various times, society's
focus centers on one theory or another. As society's thoughts on human nature have evolved, so
has the theoretical basis for punishment.
31. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). The Gregg Court concluded that "[retribution]
as an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct [is not] inconsistent
with our respect for the dignity of men." Id.
32. Exodus 21:24 (King James). "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."
Id.
33. J. WILsoN & R. HERRNsTEiN, supra note 30, at 496.
34. Just, Executing Youthful Offenders: The Unanswered Questions in Eddings v. Oklahoma,
13 FoRD Am URBAN L.J. 471, 482 (1984-85) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
35. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 30, at 24-25.
36. Comment, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1665 (1986).
37. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 30, at 24.
38. Streib, supra note 26, at 5.
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risdictions which provided for capital punishment, nineteen had set a
statutory minimum age for the imposition of a sentence of death.
3 9
Nine other jurisdictions set no minimum age within the death penalty
statute itself but indirectly established a minimum age through statutes
which provided for juvenile transfer to adult court.4 The remaining
nine jurisdictions had no minimum age restrictions in either their death
penalty statutes or their juvenile transfer statutes'.4
III. RECENT CHALLENGES TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATUTES WHICH IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY
UPON MINORS
The United States Constitution sets no minimum age for imposition
of the death penalty. Because the eighth amendment proscribes the
infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments," and because members
of the judiciary are appointed to interpret the Constitution, the United
States Supreme Court is necessarily called upon to make a final de-
termination of whether a particular sentence of death is "cruel and
unusual." Although the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied
to the juvenile offender first came before the Court in 1981, the Court
in Eddings v. Oklahoma42 avoided the constitutional question by deciding
that case on other grounds.
In 1987, however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case
involving a convicted juvenile murderer to consider the constitutional
issues surrounding the juvenile death penalty. 4 Indeed, within a twelve
month period, the Court was called upon three times to determine
whether the infliction of the death penalty upon a juvenile fit within
the contours of "cruel and unusual punishment." For a clearer un-
derstanding of the types of offenses which led to the Court's holdings
in these cases, the facts and circumstances of each case are set forth
below.
A. Thompson v. Oklahoma
On January 22, 1983, fifteen-year-old William Wayne Thompson,"
39. Id. Jurisdictions with a minimum age of eighteen are California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee,
and the Federal Government. Jurisdictions with a minimum age of seventeen are Georgia, North
Carolina, and Texas. Jurisdictions with a minimum age of sixteen are Indiana, Kentucky, and
Nevada. Id. at 6.
40. Id. Jurisdictions with a minimum transfer age of fifteen are Louisiana and Virginia. Juris-
dictions with a minimum transfer age of fourteen are Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Missouri, and
Utah. One jurisdiction, Mississippi, has a minimum transfer age of thirteen. Montana has a minimum
transfer age of twelve. Id.
41. Id. These remaining nine jurisdictions are Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
42. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
43. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
44. The son of a truck driver and one of eight children, Thompson had numerous prior arrests
for shoplifting and assault. Just prior to the murder, Thompson dropped out of the tenth grade.
Seligson, Are They Too Young to Die?, PARADE MAGAZINE, Oct. 19, 1986, at 5.
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along with his brother and two friends, 45 left his mother's home stating,
"We're going to kill Charles.""6 Shortly thereafter, Charles Keene was
abducted from his home and murdered. 47
On February 18, 1983, Keene's body was recovered from the Washita
River.48 Evidence at trial was overwhelming and proved that Thompson
and his companions premeditated Keene's abduction and brutal mur-
der.4 9 Before weighting the body with chains and a concrete block and
throwing it into the river, Thompson slashed Keene's abdomen and
chest "so that fish could eat his body." 0
Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted by a jury of first degree
murder, and sentenced to death.5 1 The Court of Criminal Appeals of
Oklahoma, relying on its decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma5 2 held that
the execution of a minor certified as an adult and convicted of murder
is not cruel or unusual punishment.5 3 As a result, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the sentence of death.5 4
The-United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two
issues, but the principal question was whether a death sentence imposed
upon a convicted murderer who was fifteen at the time of the crime
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment.5 5 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals, and a plurality of the Court held that the execution of such an
individual was unconstitutional.3 6 Limiting the scope of the opinion to
juvenile offenders who had not reached their sixteenth birthday, the
Thompson plurality declined to confront directly the constitutionality
of executing juveniles as a class.
B. Stanford v. Kentucky
On January 7, 1981, seventeen-year-old Kevin Stanford, 57 along with
an accomplice, 58 repeatedly raped and sodomized Baerbel Poore during
45. Thompson's brother Anthony James Mann and their friends, Bobby Glass and Richard
Jones, were tried separately. Each was convicted of first-degree murder and each received a sentence
of death. Thompson, 724 P.2d at 782.
46. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 860. Charles Keene was the former brother-in-law of Thompson
and Mann.
47. Thompson, 724 P.2d at 786. Like many juveniles on death row, Thompson grew up witnessing
violence firsthand, much of it committed within his family by the brother-in-law he killed. Seligson,
supra note 44, at 5.
48. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 861.
49. Id. Keene had been beaten, had his leg broken, had his throat cut, was kicked in the head,
and was shot in the head twice. Id.
50. Id.
51. Thompson, 724 P.2d at 782.
52. Id. at 784. In Eddings, the Court held that once a minor is certified to stand trial as an
adult, he may be punished as an adult without violation of the eighth amendment. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 786.
55. The court of criminal appeals deemed photographic evidence which was admitted at the guilt
phase of the trial harmless error. It did not consider whether such evidence constituted reversible
error when admitted during the penalty phase. Because of the Supreme Court's disposition of the
principal question, it did not consider this second question presented. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
56. Id.
57. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987). On the date of the murder, Stanford
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and after the robbery of the gasoline station where she was employed.5 9
The victim was then driven to an isolated area where Stanford shot
her twice, fatally, in the head.60
Stanford was arrested on January 13, 1981. 6I In October 1981, a
Kentucky juvenile court, like the Oklahoma court in Thompson, certified
Stanford for trial as an adult.62 In August 1982, Stanford was tried
by a jury and convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree sodomy,
first-degree robbery, and receiving stolen property.63  Under a state
statute which set the minimum age for execution at sixteen, the court
sentenced Stanford to death plus forty-five years of incarceration.
64
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence and held
that the imposition of the death penalty was neither excessive nor
disproportionate. 65
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
the imposition of capital punishment on an individual for a crime he
committed at the age of seventeen constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the eighth amendment. 66 The Supreme Court affirmed
the Kentucky Supreme Court, and a plurality held that the execution
of an individual who was seventeen at the time of the crime was
constitutional .6
7
C. Missouri v. Wilkins
Typical of many juveniles facing the death penalty, Heath Wilkins
was in and out of juvenile facilities from the age of eight.68 Among
was seventeen years and four months old. Since the age of ten, Stanford was in and out of juvenile
court for numerous offenses, including theft, burglary, arson, assault, and sexual abuse, among
others. On a repeated basis, but to no avail, Stanford received treatment available to youthful
offenders in Kentucky. Id. at 792.
58. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365. David Buchanan confessed to rape, sodomy and robbery. He
implicated Stanford as the triggerman. He further identified a third juvenile, Troy Johnson, as the
driver of the getaway vehicle and as the individual who supplied the gun used by Stanford. Stanford,
734 S.W.2d at 784.
59. Stanford, 734 S.W.2d at 783. Baerbel Poore was a young mother of an eleven-month-old
child at the time of her murder. Id. at 790. The robbery netted a small amount of cash, two
gallons of gasoline, and 300 cartons of cigarettes. Id. at 783.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365. Ky. Ray. STAT. § 208.170 (Michie 1982) provides for waiver of
juvenile court jurisdiction when the offender is charged with a class A felony or capital crime or
is over sixteen at the time of a felony offense. Id.
63. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366. Motions for separate trials were denied, and Buchanan and
Stanford were tried together. The state sought the death penalty for both juveniles, but it did not
object when Buchanan moved to exclude the death penalty as to him. Buchanan received a life
sentence. Stanford, 734 S.W.2d at 784.
64. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
65. Stanford, 734 S.W.2d at 793.
66. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364-65.
67. Id. at 380.68. Id. at 367.
Spring 1991]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
numerous other offenses, Wilkins attempted to murder his own mother
by putting insecticide into Tylenol capsules. 69
On July 27, 1985, at the age of sixteen years and seven months,
Wilkins, along with four friends, executed a plan conceived by Wilkins
two weeks earlier. 70 At approximately 10:30 p.m., two of the fourjuveniles entered Linda's Liquors and Deli. 7' According to the plan,
Wilkins rushed around the counter and stabbed 26-year-old Nancy Allen
in the back. 72 When Wilkins and his accomplice were unable to open
the cash register, their victim assisted them.73 Wilkins then thrust his
knife into Nancy Allen's chest three times, piercing her heart. 74 As
Allen begged for her life, Wilkins stabbed her four more times in the
throat, opening her carotid artery.7
Like Thompson and Stanford, Wilkins was certified for trial as an
adult under a state statute which permitted juvenile felons between the
ages of fourteen and seventeen to be tried as adults.7 6 Wilkins entered
guilty pleas to charges of first-degree murder, armed criminal action,
and carrying a concealed weapon.7 7 Both the state and Wilkins himself
sought the death penalty. 78
Finding that the murder involved "depravity of mind and that as a
result thereof, it was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or in-
human," the trial court found the death penalty appropriate. 79 Mis-
souri's death penalty statute set no minimum age for its imposition. 0
On a mandatory review, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the
lower court, rejecting the "cruel and unusual" argument. 8' As in Stan-
69. Id. Wilkins had committed various acts of burglary, theft, arson, and killing of neighborhood
animals. Psychiatric testimony indicated that although Wilkins knew right from wrong, heavy drug
use affected his cognitive functioning. Wilkins had used marijuana since age five and had abused
inhalants, stimulants and depressants since age six. Wilkins estimated that he had inhaled gasoline
fumes on 500 occasions, and he admitted that he had used LSD, his favorite drug, since age ten.
Missouri v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409, 422 n.13 (Mo. 1987) (en bane).
70. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d at 411. Juveniles Patrick Stevens, Ray Thompson, and Marjorie Filipiak
were part of Wilkins' plan to rob the liquor store and to kill whoever was on duty. During the
two weeks prior to the murder, Wilkins worked on sharpening his butterfly knife.
71. Id. The four met at the North Kansas City Hospital. Wilkins and Stevens headed to the
liquor store through the woods. They waited until no customers were present, cleaned their shoes
to avoid identifying mudprints and entered the store. As planned, Wilkins ordered a sandwich while
Stevens used the restroom behind the counter. As Stevens rushed out of the restroom to grab Nancy
Allen, Wilkins came around the counter with his sharpened knife. After the murder and robbery,
Wilkins and Stevens returned to the hospital where, as planned, Thompson and Filipiak were waiting
with taxis. Id. at 411-12.
72. Id. Attempting to inflict what he considered a fatal wound, Wilkins aimed at his victim's
kidneys. Id. Nancy Allen, a married mother of two, owned and operated the convenience store in
which she was murdered. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.; Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.071 (1986).
77. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 367.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Thompson, 487 U.S. 827-28.
81. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368.
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ford, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the eighth amendment argument 82 and affirmed the Supreme Court of
Missouri. 3
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. The Decision in Thompson
In reaching its holding in Thompson, a plurality of the Court de-
termined that executing a person who was less than sixteen years old
at the time of his offense offended the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society" and, therefore, violated
the proscription of the eighth amendment.8 4 Because the drafters of
the eighth amendment did not precisely define "cruel and unusual,"
the Thompson plurality relied upon its own interpretation of the moral
conscience of modern American society.85 In its search for these "evolv-
ing standards of decency," the Court considered relevant state statutes
and jury determinations to be objective signs of the moral conscience
of American society and used these sources to confirm the Court's
own judgment. 86 In addition, the Court reviewed the social purposes
served by the death penalty.
87
1. Legislative Enactments
Speaking through Justice Stevens, the Thompson plurality noted that
although the delineation between childhood and adulthood varied from
state to state, all states defined an individual under sixteen years of age
as a minor for most legal purposes. 88 With regard to the death penalty,
nineteen states had set no statutory minimum age for the penalty's
imposition. 89 Because the plurality accepted the premise that a minimum
age for imposition of the death penalty does exist, it ignored these nineteen
states. The plurality expressed uncertainty that these states' legislatures
had focused on and deliberately decided the issue9° because their statutes
did not set a minimum age for the death penalty.
The Thompson plurality then confined its analysis to the eighteen states
which had established a statutory minimum age for death sentences.
9
'
82. Id.
83. Id. at 380.
84. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
85. Id. at 822-23.
86. Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277-79 (1972)). The Court recognized its long
history of similar analysis.
87. Id. at 836.
88. Id. at 824.
89. Id. at 826-27. Oklahoma has not expressed a statutory minimum age in its death penalty
statute. Id. at 827-28.
90. Id at 827. In furtherance of its eighth amendment inquiry, the plurality stressed that fourteen
states were without a death penalty statute of any sort. Id. at 826.
91. Id. at 828-29. In New Mexico, a defendant convicted of a capital felony may be sentenced
to life imprisonment or death. If, however, the defendant has not reached the age of eighteen at
the time of the commission of the capital felony, he must be sentenced to life imprisonment. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (1978).
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All eighteen states required the offender to have reached the age of
sixteen at the time of the offense. 92 Justice Stevens concluded that the
legislative enactments of these eighteen states were indicators of contem-
porary standards of decency and that the plurality's conclusion comported
with the views of several of this nation's professional organizations and
the emerging international standard among countries that allow the death
penalty. 93
Justice O'Connor's narrow concurrence and deciding vote in Thompson
established a two-part standard for determining when a state may impose
a sentence of death upon a juvenile. A state may impose the death
penalty upon a juvenile only when: (1) its legislature has seriously con-
sidered the issue of age and has clearly expressed its judgment through
a statutory minimum age requirement; or (2) absent such statutory spec-
ificity, it is clear that no national consensus forbids the practice. 94 Because
Oklahoma's death penalty statute failed to set a minimum age for im-
position of a sentence of death, 95 and because every state legislature that
had set a minimum age for capital punishment set the age at sixteen or
above, 96 Justice O'Connor concluded that there was a national consensus
against executing juveniles under the age of sixteen and that Thompson's
death sentence should be vacated.97
Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that adolescents as a class
are generally less blameworthy than adults.98 She declined, however, to
adopt the plurality's conclusion that as a matter of constitutional law
no fifteen-year-old is capable of the moral culpability required for the
imposition of the death penalty. 9 Justice O'Connor concurred only with
the judgment of the plurality. She left for the state legislatures to decide
the broader question of whether any person younger than sixteen at the
time of his crime can constitutionally be executed. °°
2. Jury Determinations
Because jury sentencing patterns reflect public opinion, the plurality
concluded that the execution of a person fifteen years old or younger
at the time of his crime is "generally abhorrent to the conscience of the
92. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.
93. Id. at 830. The American Bar Association and the American Law Institute oppose the deathpenalty for juveniles. Amnesty International opposes capital punishment for anyone, but it defines
eighteen as the standard minimum age among countries where the death penalty is imposed. Id.94. Id. at 857-58. Thompson" became death eligible through a combination of two Oklahoma
statutes: Oklahoma's death penalty statute, which does not specify a minimum age, and a statutethat establishes the circumstances under which a juvenile may be certified to stand trial as an adult.Although Justice O'Connor agreed that under this statutory scheme Oklahoma could not execute
an offender who was less than sixteen at the time of his capital offense, she declined to hold that
no state could constitutionally do so.
95. Id. at 857.
96. Id. at 849.
97. Id. at 857-59.
98. Id. at 853.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 857-59.
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community."'' The plurality turned to statistical evidence as the rationale
for its unambiguous conclusion.
In this century, between eighteen and twenty persons have been executed
for crimes committed when they were under the age of sixteen, the last
in 1948.102 Despite the fact that 82,094 people were arrested for homicide
during the years 1982 through 1986, only 1,393 received a death sentence, 103
and of these, only five were less than sixteen at the time of their offense. 
°1
In its interpretation of these statistics, the Thompson plurality found the
imposition of the death sentence upon these five juveniles to be "cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual. ",0
3. Social Purposes Served by Imposition of the Death Penalty
"Given the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's
capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its children,"1'6
the Thompson plurality reasoned that the social purposes underlying
penalty, deterrence, and retribution are not fulfilled by the execution of
a fifteen-year-old. 17 The plurality dismissed the deterrent value of the
juvenile death penalty, citing its conviction that a teenage offender is
unable to make the cost-benefit analysis required.38 Notwithstanding the
Court's recognition in Gregg of the retributive function of capital pun-
ishment, the Thompson plurality concluded that juvenile offenders, be-
cause of their lesser culpability, do not deserve the full "expression of
society's moral outrage."' 1 In dictum, the plurality concluded that ret-
ribution was "simply inapplicable" to the execution of a fifteen-year-
old."10
Although the Justices who formed the plurality in Thompson would
have drawn a constitutional line prohibiting the execution of all individuals
under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense,"' the court was
unable to do so," 2 narrowing the scope of its decision to those under
sixteen."' Following Thompson, questions concerning the constitutionality
of executing sixteen or seventeen-year-olds remained.
B. Stanford and Wilkins Decisions
Because the dissenting Justices in Thompson formed the plurality in
Stanford, it comes as no surprise that the opinion in Stanford was a
101. Id. at 832.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 831 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972)).
106. Id. at 837.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 836-37.
110. Id.
111. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 382.
112. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
113. Id.
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direct counter to that in Thompson. Agreeing with the Thompson plurality
that an interpretation of "cruel and unusual" punishment should be
dictated by "objective indicia" which reflect "evolving standards of
decency, ' '" 14 the Stanford plurality likewise considered legislative
enactments" 5 and their application by sentencing juries.116 Justice Scalia,
writing for the Stanford plurality, emphatically rejected the position of
the Thompson plurality that "it is for us ultimately to judge whether
the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty," positing
that to do so would "replace judges of the law with a committee of
philosopher-kings.""17 For Scalia, the Court's job is to "identify the
'evolving standards of decency'; to determine, not what they should be,
but what they are.""' 8
Finding that the majority of states which provided for the death penalty
applied it to offenders who committed capital offenses at age sixteen
and above," 9 the plurality did not find "the degree of national consensus"
required to label this punishment "cruel and unusual."' 20 Acknowledging
that only two percent of actual executions in the United States had been
for crimes committed by individuals under the age of eighteen,' 2' theplurality dismissed the conclusion that prosecutors and juries found the
ultimate punishment "categorically unacceptable."1 Rather, the plurality
concluded that "the very considerations which induce petitioners and
their supporters to believe that death should never be imposed on offenders
under 18 cause prosecutors and juries to believe that it should rarely be
imposed." 123
Next, the Stanford plurality dismissed as irrelevant those state statutes
which set a minimum age of eighteen for individuals to participate in
various activities such as consuming alcohol and voting.' 24 Justice Scalia
noted that the judgment required to "vote intelligently" is obviously
greater than that required for a clear understanding that murder is
wrong. 25 Further, Justice Scalia distinguished such laws because they do
not provide for the constitutionally required "individualized considera-
tion" of laws concerning capital punishment. 26
Finally, the Stanford plurality rejected the views of professional or-
ganizations and various interest groups as a basis upon which to rest
constitutional law. 27 For the plurality, were the opinions of such groups
114. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-71.
115. Id. at 370.
116. Id. at 373.
.117. Id. at 379.
118. Id. at 378.
119. Id. at 370-71.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 373.
122. Id at 374.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 375.
127. Id. at 377.
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as sweeping as suggested, a national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty would appear in the enacted laws of the people.
2
As in Thompson, Justice O'Connor provided the deciding vote in
Stanford.129 Justice O'Connor applied her two-part standard developed
in her Thompson concurrence to the separate facts of Stanford and
Wilkins. 30 Because the Kentucky legislature had considered the issue of
age in capital murder cases and had set the minimum age for execution
at sixteen,' 3' and because it was "sufficiently clear that no national
consensus forbids the imposition of capital punishment on 16 or 17-year-
old capital murderers,"'13 2 the rationale underlying Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Thompson did not apply to Stanford.
Like Oklahoma, Missouri had not expressed a statutory minimum age
in its death penalty statute,'33 but rather operated under an implied
minimum age for death sentences based on an express minimum age of
fourteen for adult court jurisdiction. 3 4 Finding, however, that "such
specificity is not necessary to avoid constitutional problems if it is clear
that no national consensus forbids the imposition of capital punishment
for crimes committed at such an age," '35 Justice O'Connor, joining the
plurality, concluded that neither Wilkins' nor Stanford's death sentence
should be set aside. 36
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Because one-half of the states with death penalty statutes have failed
to set a statutory minimum age for imposition of the death penalty,
state legislatures will undoubtedly tackle the issue to avoid expensive
constitutional challenges. Only if enough states opt for setting the min-
imum age at fifteen will the national consensus against the execution of
fifteen-year-olds disappear. Only then, under the Court's present rea-
soning, will the death sentence of a fifteen-year-old offender be affirmed.
Because, however, "every single American legislature that has expressly
set a minimum age for capital punishment has set that age at 16 or
above,"' 3 7 this possibility seems unlikely. Considering the opposing view-
points among the Justices of the current Supreme Court regarding this
issue, it is far more likely that the Court will deny certiorari in cases
posing the same constitutional challenge, at least in the near future.
Thus, the issue will be left for resolution by individual state legislatures.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 380.
130. Id. at 381.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Streib, supra note 26, at 6.
135. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
136. Id. at 381.
137. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Thompson v. Oklahoma3 " and Stanford v. Kentucky, ,39 the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the execution of an individual
who was a minor at the time of his offense constitutes "cruel and unusual
punishment" within the meaning of the eighth amendment. In Thompson,
a four member plurality pronounced that no fifteen-year-old is capable
of the maturity and responsibility required for the moral culpability thatjustifies a sentence of death: to impose such a penalty would be "ab-
horrent" to the conscience of the community, even when a jury repre-
senting that community finds otherwise. Although Supreme Court justices
are appointed to interpret the Constitution, the Justices forming the
Thompson plurality relied on their own interpretation of the moral con-
science of modern American society when deciding that case.
One year after Thompson, the dissent in Thompson formed a new
plurality in Stanford. It concluded that the execution of sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds is neither "cruel and unusual at the time that the
Bill of Rights was adopted,' 140 nor is it "contrary to the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' '4 Analyzing
the holdings in Thompson, Stanford, and Wilkins, it appears that the
United States Supreme Court has set the age of sixteen as the minimum
age for imposition of the death penalty. The failure of a clear majority
to coalesce in the decision, however, allows for speculation about what
the Court might do in the future.
Without question, the death penalty is the ultimate penalty for a crime.
Proponents of capital punishment insist that it is just and useful. Re-
sponding abolitionists argue that a sentence of death fails to deter and
is morally wrong. While it may be impossible to prove that the death
penalty is a better deterrent than alternative forms of punishment, the
benefit of executing a guilty individual is sufficient if fear of receiving
the death penalty deters only one prospective killer from murdering aninnocent victim. The offender, by committing the crime, assumes the risk
of the punishment that he could otherwise avoid. 42
Perhaps the drafters of the Constitution declined to set a minimum
age at which a state may impose a sentence of death because there is
no magic age at which all individuals achieve competency. The only real
question is whether the particular offender is competent.
"Individualized consideration [is] a constitutional requirement" when
considering a sentence of death.' 43 Sentencing juries and judges deciding
this critical issue under the particular facts of each case offer a clearer
138. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
139. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
140. Id. at 368.
141. Id. at 369.
142. Comment, supra note 36, at 1668. In his comment, Ernest van den Haag, Professor of Law
at Fordham University, thoroughly discusses, and then counters, many arguments often offered
against the death penalty.
143. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375.
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path to justice than legislators and members of the judiciary selecting
an arbitrary number based upon conflicting statistical studies replete with
endless, politically influenced, interpretations.
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